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Abstract
In the standard model with two stocks, natural resource and physical cap-
ital, the fundamental efficiency condition is the Hotelling rule. If we add a
third stock, knowledge, as for instance in endogenous growth models, a new
efficiency condition is obtained. This condition highlights the fundamental
public good nature of knowledge. Moreover, we show that if suffices to use
Lindhal prices in a competitive economy to implement optimum.
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1 Introduction
Since the Hotelling’s (1931) seminal paper, the standard literature on non
renewable resources, in particular the literature on growth, has studied a
model with essentially two stocks : the (finite) stock of natural resource and
the stock of physical capital.
In this type of framework, the fundamental efficiency condition, that is
to say the necessary local condition that has to be verified along any ef-
ficient path, is called the Hotelling rule. It says that, at each time, the
marginal productivity of capital has to be equal to the rate of growth of
the marginal productivity of the resource (for more details, see for instance
Withagen (1999)). This condition is the socially optimal solution of the arbi-
trage problem in which the social planner has to choose between keeping the
resource in situ, or extracting and embodying it in physical capital. More-
over, if one considers a decentralized economy in which the resource sector
is competitive, the maximization of the profit function in this sector leads to
the “Hotelling rule at equilibrium”, which says that the interest rate on the
perfect financial market is equal to the rate of growth of the resource price.
This condition implies the preceeding one : in other words, in a competitive
equilibrium, the efficiency Hotelling rule is satisfied, that is in fact a direct
implication of the first welfare theorem.
From the 1980s, some new stocks variables have been introduced in en-
dogenous growth models. For instance, Lucas (1988) introduced human cap-
ital and, some years later, Romer (1990), Grossman-Helpman (1991) and
Aghion-Howitt (1992) introduced knowledge as the main factors of growth.
In the second part of the 1990s, some authors, like Schou (1996), Aghion-
Howitt (1998) and Scholz-Ziemes (1999), have reconsidered the question of
sustainability of growth by introducing non renewable resources in endoge-
nous growth models with knowledge accumulation. With respect to the stan-
dard literature of the 1970s-1980s, this new analysis consider now three stocks
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variables : natural resources, physical capital, and knowledge. Then, new
questions are raised that we try to answer in this paper.
The first question concerns the characterization of efficient paths. We
know that the Hotelling rule is the efficiency condition concerning the arbi-
trage between keeping the resource in situ or enbodying it in physical capital.
What is the new efficiency condition, and what is its economic interpreta-
tion, if we consider the arbitrage between natural resource and knowledge ?
In order to answer this question, we have to take into account two main
characteristics of the problem. First, it is generally assumed that knowledge,
for instance new goods in Romer (1990) or new qualities in Aghion-Howitt
(1992), is produced by using labor (without resource). In this case, it is
not generally possible to directly embody resource in knowledge. Then, the
mechanism that has to be considered is the following : if the social planner
increases the flow of extraction, he releases labor from the final output sector.
This labor can be transfered to the research sector, that allows to increase
knowledge : this transfer of labor allows indirectly to embody resource in
knowledge. Second, contrarily to the physical capital which appears in the
standard Hotelling rule and which is a private good, knowledge is a public
good, that is to say a non rival, or non depletable good (see for instance
Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), chapter 11), which is simultaneously
used by the firms producing the final output and by the firms of the research
sector. Thus, some features of the new efficiency condition obtained here are
close to the standard Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition.
The second point that we study in this paper concerns the functionning
of a decentralized economy, and the implementation of optimum. Contrarily
to the case of the standard model where the Hotelling rule is satisfied in a
competitive economy, there is here a problem of decentralization due to the
public good nature of knowledge. In standard endogenous growth models, it
is generally assumed that each new good is produced by a monopoly, that
allows to finance ex ante the research activity. In this paper, we proceed in
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two steps. First, we compute the Lindahl prices which allow to implement the
optimal path in a decentralized competitive economy. Second, taking again
the standard assumption of monopolies on intermediate goods, we describe
the general equilibrium, and we compute the exact values of the public tools
which allow to implement the optimum.
Along all the paper, at optimum and at equilibrium, we present the dif-
ferent results in a rather general model, that is to say without particular
specifications. However, at each step, we consider an example in which we
use our general formulas to compute analytically the solutions, in particular
the rates of growth of the different variables at the steady state. In fact,
this example takes again the common model of Schou (1996), Aghion-Howitt
(1998) and Scholz-Ziemes (1999), and their results are progressively recov-
ered, at optimum, then at equilibrium. With respect to the example studied
by theses authors, the new results presented here concern essentially the equi-
librium. First we compute the Lindahl prices in the first type of equilibrium.
Second, in the other type, which is studied by Schou, Aghion-Howitt, and
Sholz-Ziemes, we compute the optimal tools, subsidy to research and sub-
sidy to monopolies, which allow to implement the optimal path obtained in
section 2.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model and
we characterize the efficient paths. In particular, we derive the new efficiency
condition concerning the arbitrage between natural resource and knowledge.
In section 3, we consider a decentralized economy, and we study the two
types of equilibrium mentionned above : the first one with Lindahl prices,
the second one with monopolies on intermediate goods. Finally, we present
our conclusions in section 4.
3
2 Efficiency in an economy with a natural re-
source, physical capital and knowledge
2.1 The model
We consider an economy where a final homogeneous good (Y ) is produced
by m firms (i = 1, . . . ,m). Each firm i has a production function
Y it = F
i
(
Lit, R
i
t,
∫ nt
0
f i(xit(j))dj
)
(1)
where Lit and R
i
t are the quantities of labor and natural resource used at time
t ; xit(j) is the quantity of intermediate good j, with j ∈ [0, nt] : nt is the
measure of the space of intermediate goods (interpreted as the “number” of
goods, namely knowledge). We assume that f i() is an increasing and strictly
concave function of xi(j). We denote by X it =
∫ nt
0
f i(xit(j))dj the index of
intermediate goods, and by F iL, F
i
R and F
i
X the partial derivatives of the
production function.
The final good is used for consumption (ct) and investment (K˙t). Thus
we have
Yt =
m∑
i=1
Y it = ct + K˙t (2)
Following for instance Grossman-Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990), we
assume that, in the R&D sector, M firms (h = 1, . . . ,M) produce innova-
tions along with
n˙ht = q
h(nt, `
h
t ), q
h
n > 0, q
h
` > 0, (3)
where n˙ht and `
h
t are respectively the number of innovations produced at t
and the labor used in research by firm h. As it is usual in this type of model,
we assume that the total number of goods, nt, is also an input. Note that,
at each time t, the total number of innovations in the economy is
n˙t =
M∑
h=1
n˙ht =
M∑
h=1
qh(nt, `
h
t ).
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Normalizing labor supply to one, we have at each time t
m∑
i=1
Lit +
M∑
h=1
`ht = 1. (4)
We assume that, once a new good is invented, it is produced by capital
alone : one unit of capital is needed for each unit of intermediate good. Thus,
at each date t, we have
xt(j) = Kt(j), for all j ∈ [0, nt] (5)
where xt(j) =
∑m
i=1 x
i
t(j) is the total quantity of intermediate good j. Recall
(see (2) above) that Kt =
∫ nt
0
Kt(j)dj is the total stock of capital.
If we denote by S0 the initial stock of resource, the stock at t is given by
St = S0 −
∫ t
0
Rνdν (6)
where Rt =
∑m
i=1 R
i
t is the total flow extracted at t. We assume that there is
no extraction cost.
2.2 Efficient paths
Our first objective is to characterize the efficient paths. We consider an
interval of time (t0, t1). Let be {ct}t1t0 a given profile of consumption on this
interval, and let be Kt0 and Kt1 the given levels of capital at t0 and t1. Then
the program of the social planner is to minimize the flow of extraction under
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the constraints (1) to (6). After reorganization, this program can be written
min
∫ t1
t0
(
m∑
i=1
Rit
)
dt
subject to K˙t =
m∑
i=1
F i
(
Lit, R
i
t,
∫ nt
0
f i(xit(j))dj
)
− ct
S˙t = −
m∑
i=1
Rit
n˙t =
M∑
h=1
qh(nt, l
h
t ) (7)
∫ nt
0
(
m∑
i=1
xit(j)
)
dj −Kt = 0
m∑
i=1
Lit +
M∑
h=1
lht = 1
Proposition 1 An efficient path of the economy is characterized by the two
following conditions :
F˙R
FR
= Fx (8)
where FR = F
i
R ∀i, is the marginal productivity of the resource, and Fx =
F iXf
i′(xi(j)) ∀i, j, is the marginal productivity of any intermediate good j;
F˙R
FR
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙e
q`
+
M∑
h=1
qhn +
q`
FL
(
m∑
i=1
F iXf
i(xi(n)
)
− Fx
m∑
i=1
xi(n)), (9)
where FL = F
i
L, ∀i, and q` = qh` , ∀h, are respectively the marginal productiv-
ities of labor in the final output sector and in the research sector.
Proof : see appendix A.
Observe that, since each unit of intermediate good is produced with one
unit of capital, Fx can also be interpreted as the marginal productivity of
6
capital. Then, condition (8) says that the marginal productivity of capital
must be equal to the rate of growth of the marginal productivity of the nat-
ural resource : it is the standard Hotelling rule which concerns the arbitrage
between resource (R) and physical capital (K).
Condition (9) is a new efficiency condition which appears in this type
of endogenous growth model, and which concerns the arbitrage between re-
source (R) and knowledge (n). We can already observe that the fundamental
public good nature of knowledge (n) appears in the right side of the equation
where we see the symbols
∑M
h=1() and
∑m
i=1(), as for instance in the classic
optimality condition derived by Samuelson (1954 ; 1955).
Let us give an intuitive interpretation of these two conditions.
2.2.1 Natural resource and physical capital : the Hotelling rule
First, in order to interpret the Hotelling rule, we consider an elementary
interval of time (t, t+∆t). At t, the social planner faces the following arbitrage
concerning any unit of natural resource : either he keeps it in situ at t
and he extracts it at (t + ∆t) in order to increase the final output ; or
he extracts it at t, he uses it to accumulate more capital, that allows to
produce more of any intermediate good, and thus to produce more output.
In the first case, the increase in output at t +∆t is ∆Y 1t+∆t = FR(t +∆t) '
F˙R(t)∆t+FR(t) = FR(t)
(
F˙R(t)
FR(t)
∆t + 1
)
. In the second one, the new capital
at t is ∆Kt = FR(t), and the new output at t + ∆t (new capital and new
production) is ∆Y 2t+∆t = ∆Kt + Fx(t)∆Kt∆t = FR(t) + Fx(t)FR(t)∆t =
FR(t)(Fx(t)∆t + 1). It is clear that we have ∆Y
1
t+∆t = ∆Y
2
t+∆t if and only if
F˙R(t)/FR(t) = Fx(t) : it is the Hotelling rule. If F˙R(t)/FR(t) < Fx(t), the
social planner has to extract more today in order to accumulate more capital.
If F˙R(t)/FR(t) > Fx(t), he has to extract less today.
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2.2.2 Natural resource and knowledge : the new condition
Now, we interpret the second efficiency condition (a more formal interpreta-
tion is given in Appendix B). In the Hotelling rule, the arbitrage concerns
the choice between keeping the natural resource in situ or embodying it in
physical capital. In the new condition, it is between keeping it in situ or in-
directly embodying it in knowledge. As we said above, in this type of model,
the natural resource is only used in the final sector. Thus, it is not possible
to directly embody it in knowledge. If the social planner increases the flow of
extraction, he can transfer labor from the final sector to the research activity,
that allows to increase knowledge accumulation. This is the reason why we
speak of indirect embodying.
We again consider an interval of time (t, t+∆t). As before, if one unit of
resource is kept in situ at t and extracted at t+∆t, the increase in output at
t+∆t is ∆1t+∆t = FR(t)
(
F˙R(t)
FR(t)
∆t + 1
)
. Assume that this unit is extracted
at t. This extraction allows to stimulate research by three channels.
First, assuming that the total output is unchanged, it allows to decrease
the labor (L) used in the final sector by FR(t)/FL(t). If this labor is devoted
to research (dlt = −dLt), knowledge (n) increases by dn1 = FR(t)
FL(t)
q`(t).
Second, the intertemporal cumulative effect of n on n˙ (remember that
n˙t =
∑M
h=1 q
h(nt, `
h
t )) leads to an increase in knowledge,
dn2 =
FR(t)
FL(t)
q`(t)
M∑
h=1
qhn(t)∆t, on (t, t +∆t).
Third, the increase in knowledge leads to more final output, that allows
to save more labor (L) and thus to produce more knowledge. From (1), the
gross increase in output is
FR(t)
FL(t)
q`(t)
m∑
i=1
F iXf
i(xi(n))∆t. However, since in-
termediate goods are produced from capital, we have Kt =
∫ nt
0
∑m
i=1 x
i
t(j)dj.
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Thus we need a quantity of capital given by
FR(t)q`(t)
FL(t)
m∑
i=1
xi(n). This quan-
tity of capital can be obtained by decreasing the corresponding quantity
of any intermediate good j, that yields a decrease in final output given by
Fx(t)
FR(t)q`(t)
FL(t)
m∑
i=1
xi(n)∆t. Finally, the net increase in output is
FR(t)
FL(t)
q`(t)
(
m∑
i=1
F iXf
i(xi(n))− Fx
m∑
i=1
xi(n)
)
∆t.
If the social planner uses this new output to save more labor (L) and to
transfer it to the research sector, this yields to an increase in knowledge,
dn3 =
FR(t)q`(t)
FL(t)
q`(t)
FL(t)
(
m∑
i=1
F iXf
i(xi(n))− Fx
m∑
i=1
xi(n)
)
∆t.
Summing up dn1, dn2 and dn3, we obtain the new knowledge produced
after the extraction of one unit of resource :
dn = dn1 + dn2 + dn3 =
FR(t)q`(t)
FL(t)
[
1 +
(
M∑
h=1
qhn(t) +
q`(t)
FL(t)
(
m∑
i=1
F iXf
i(xi(n))− Fx
m∑
i=1
xi(n)
))
∆t
]
This increase in knowledge allows to obtain an increase in the final out-
put at (t + ∆t) given by ∆Y 2t+∆t ' dn
FL(t +∆t)
q`(t +∆t)
, where
q`(t)FL(t +∆t)
FL(t)q`(t +∆t)
is
approximatively equal to 1 +
(
F˙L(t)
FL(t)
− q˙`(t)
q`(t)
)
∆t. Finally, we have
∆Y 2t+∆t '
FR(t)
{
1 +
[
F˙L
FL
− q˙`
q`
+
M∑
h=1
qhn +
q`
FL
(
m∑
i=1
F iXf
i(xi(n))− Fx
m∑
i=1
xi(n)
)]
∆t
}
,
where we neglect the second-order terms.
Equalizing this quantity to ∆Y 1t+∆t = FR
(
1 +
F˙R
FR
∆t
)
, we find again
exactly the arbitrage condition (9), whose we have now an interpretation.
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In brief, in the Hotelling rule, the social planner can extract more today,
embody this resource in capital, that allows to produce more tomorrow and
thus to economize resource. In the new efficiency condition, if he extracts
more today, he can allocate the released labor to the research sector, that
allows to accumulate more knowledge, and thus to produce more tomorrow
and to economize resource. The main point here is that each increase in
knowledge has a cumulative effect that comes from the specific form of the
research sector technology.
If ∆Y 1t+∆t < ∆Y
2
t+∆t, the social planner has to extract more today, in
order to transfer labor from the final output sector to the research one, and
thus in order to produce more innovations.
If ∆Y 1t+∆t > ∆Y
2
t+∆t, the social planner has to extract less today, and thus
to produce less innovations.
Remark 1 : consider the standard neoclassical model, where the final
good (Y ) is produced by using the natural resource and physical capital
along with Yt = F (Kt, Rt) and characterize the efficient paths. In this case,
the social planner minimizes the flow of extraction
∫ t1
t0
Rtdt, subject to the
constraints K˙ = F (Kt, Rt)− ct and S˙t = −Rt. This program easily leads to
the Hotelling rule : F˙R/FR = FK . Indeed, the Hamiltonian is
H = R + λ(F (K,R)− c)− µR
The first order conditions are 1 + λFR − µ = 0,−µ˙ = 0 and −λ˙ = λFK .
Differentiating the first one with respect to t and using the two others give
immediately the Hotelling rule : F˙R/FR = FK .
Remark 2 : until now, we have only been interested by efficiency. As-
sume that we want characterize the optimal paths. More precisely, inside
the efficient paths, we select those which maximize the intertemporal util-
ity
∫ t
0
u(ct)e
−ρtdt. Then we obtain in addition the Ramsey-Keynes condi-
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tion, which is ρ − u′′c˙/u′ = Fx in the first model (with knowledge) and
ρ− u′′c˙/u′ = FK in the standard neoclassical model.
Example 1 : we consider the model studied by Aghion-Howitt ((1998),
chapter 5), Schou (1996) and Scholz-Ziemes (1999), which is a particular case
of the above model.
The m firms in the final sector have the same technology :
Y it = (L
i
t)
β(Rit)
ν
∫ nt
0
xit(j)
αdj,
with α + β + ν = 1. The M firms in the research sector have also the same
technology : n˙ht = δntl
h
t , with δ > 0.
From the proof of proposition 1 (see appendix A), we have xi(j) = xi
for all i and all j, xi/Ri =
∑
i x
i/
∑
i R
i = x/R for all i, and xi/Li =∑
i x
i/
∑
i L
i = x/L for all i. Then, each individual production function can
be written Y i = (Lit)
β(Rit)
νn(xi)α = n(L/x)β(R/x)νxi. Finally, the aggregate
production function is Y = nLβRνxα = Kαn1−αLβRν , with K = xn : see
Schou (equation (2.3)), Scholz-Ziemes (equation (2.11)), and Aghion-Howitt
(p. 163).
The total number of innovations at t is
n˙t =
M∑
h=1
n˙ht = δnt
M∑
h=1
`ht = δnt`t :
see Schou (equation (2.5)), Scholz-Ziemes (equation (2.13)), and Aghion-
Howitt (p. 163).
First, consider the Hotelling rule (equation (8)) : F˙R/FR = Fx, where
FR = F
i
R and Fx = F
i
x, for all i (see proposition 1). Differentiating the
production function of firm i with respect to Ri, we get :
F iR = ν(L
i)β(Ri)ν−1
∫ n
0
xi(j)αdj = ν(Li)β(Ri)ν−1n(xi)α
= νn(Ri/Li)ν−1(xi/Li)α = νn(R/L)ν−1(x/L)α = νnLβRν−1xα
= νY/R = ∂Y/∂R,
since Y = nLβRνxα. Thus, we have F˙R/FR = gY − gR (where gy is the rate
of growth of any variable y).
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Similary, differentiating this production function with respect to xi(j),
we get : ∂Y i/∂xi(j) = F ix = α(L
i)β(Ri)ν(xi)α−1 = α(Ri/Li)ν(xi/Li)α−1 =
α(R/L)ν(x/L)α−1 = αLβRνxα−1.
Finally, the Hotelling rule is
gY − gR = αLβRνxα−1 (10)
Secondly, consider the second efficiency condition (equation (9). We know
that F˙R/FR = gY − gR. Similary, it is easy to see that F˙L/FL = gY − gL.
Moreover we have −q˙`/q` +
∑M
h=1 q
h
n = 0, since
∑M
h=1 q
h
n = δ
∑
h `
h = δ` and
q` = δn, that implies q˙`/q` = n˙/n = δ`. We can also compute the last term :∑
i
F iXf
i(xi(n))− Fx
∑
i
xi(n) =
∑
i
(Li)β(Ri)ν(xi)α − αLβRνxα−1x
=
∑
i
Li(R/L)ν(x/L)α − α(R/L)ν(x/L)α−1x
= L(R/L)ν(x/L)α − αL(R/L)ν(x/L)α = L(1− α)(R/L)ν(x/L)α
The term q`/FL is equal to δnL/βY. Replacing Y by nL
βRνxα, the last
term of equation (9) is equal to δ(1−α)L)/β. Finally, this efficiency condition
becomes
−gR = −gL + δ(1− α)L
β
(11)
At steady state, all variables grow at constant rate. Thus, from (11),
L is constant, that implies gR = −δ(1 − α)L/β. Frome (10), we obtain
νgR+(α−1)gx = 0. Then using the expression of gR, we obtain gx = −νδL/β.
Since K = nx, we have gK = gn + gx = δ(1−L)− νδL/β = δ− δL(1+ ν/β),
that is also the expression of gY , since gY = gK . Finally, for a given level of
labor L used in the final sector (and thus a given level of labor ` = 1 − L
used in research) the two efficiency conditions give the rates of growth of Y
and R at steady state : gY = δ − δL(1 + ν/β) and gR = −δ(1− α)L/β.
Assume that we want to characterize the steady state optimal growth
path with an (isoelastic) instantaneaous utility function : u(c) = (c1−ε −
12
1)/(1− ε), ε > 0. Then the Keynes-Ramsey condition is gY − gR = ρ + εgc.
Since gc = gY , we have gY = (ρ + gR)/(1− ε). Using this condition and the
two efficiency conditions, we obtain finally :
L =
(
ρ
1− ε + δ
)
β(1− ε)
δε(1− α)
gR = −ρ
ε
+ δ
1− ε
ε
: see Schou (equation (3.12)) and
Aghion-Howitt (chapter 5, Appendix 2, p. 169)
and gY =
δ − ρ
ε
: see Schou (equation (3.10)) and
Aghion-Howitt (p. 169)
Growth is positive if δ−ρ > 0, and the condition gR < 0 imposes δ−ρ <
δε. Thus a balanced optimal growth path with positive growth rate exists if
0 < δ − ρ < δε : see Aghion-Howitt (p. 164).
3 Equilibria in a market economy
After the optimum characterization, we have to construct equilibria. We
claim that the fundamental difficulty to implement the optimum in a decen-
tralized economy is that knowledge is a public good which is simultaneously
used in the final sector and in the research sector. In order to stress this
point, we consider successively two types of equilibria.
First, we construct an equilibrium which is an analytical benchmark : we
assume that all markets are competitive, and we compute the Lindhal prices
with which the research is financed and that allow to implement the optimal
path. However, we are conscious that this type of equilibrium is not totally
convincing. In particular, as it is explained in many text-books, price-taking
behavior on markets with personalized prices is unlikely to occur. That is
probably why this type of equilibrium is not generally studied, in particular
in endogenous growth models with innovations.
Second, we consider a more usual equilibrium. We assume that, once an
innovation has occured, the investor of the new good retains a perpetually
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monopoly right over the production and the sale of this good. Then, the
expected profits of the monopolist allow to finance the research. The new
problem is that, by introducing these new institutions in the model, we also
introduce new distorsions that have to be corrected if we want implement
the optimal path. In particular, on each intermediate good market, the price
is higher than the marginal cost, that requires for instance to subsidy the
demand of these goods.
In this section, the price of good Y is normalized to one and wt, p
R
t and
rt are respectively the wage, the price of the resource and the interest rate
on a perfect financial market. Moreover, since the intermediate goods are all
identical, they have the same price : pt(j) = pt, j ∈ [0, nt].
We assume that the market of the natural resource is competitive. Then,
the maximization of the profit function∫ ∞
t
pRs Rse
− ∫ st rududs, for all t,
subject to the constraint S˙s = −Rs, leads to the standard “Hotelling rule at
equilibrium”
p˙Rt
pRt
= rt, ∀ t. (12)
This condition can be interpreted as the efficiency condition (8) (see 2.2.1
above). Consider an elementary interval of time (t, t+∆t). If the owner firm
extracts one unit of resource at t, sells it at price pRt , and invest p
R
t on the
financial market, the return of this operation at (t+∆t) is pRt rt∆t. If the firm
keeps the resource in situ, the return at t+∆t is (dpRt /dt)∆t = p˙
R
t ∆t. The two
returns have to be equal, that gives pRt rt∆t = p˙
R
t ∆t, and thus p˙
R
t /p
R
t = rt.
A direct consequence of (12) it that, in the standard neoclassical model
where the production function is Yt = F (Kt, Rt), if all markets are competi-
tive, we have FK = rt and FR = p
R
t (that implies F˙R = p˙
R
t ). Thus, (12) can be
written F˙R/FR = FK , that is exactly the “Hotelling rule at optimum” : this
result is a particular case of the first theorem of welfare, that holds here in
14
particular because physical capital is a private good. As we have said above,
our problem in the present model is that it is not the case for knowledge.
3.1 Lindhal equilibria
We first consider an equilibrium in which innovations are financed by Lindhal
prices. More precisely, we denote by vit and v
h
t the Lindhal prices paid at t
by each firm i and each firm h for any innovation. When a firm uses one
particular innovation, it pays the Lindhal price to the investor. Thus the total
Lindhal prices paid at time t by a firm, for instance firm i, is equal to ntv
i
t.
Let us observe that the Lindhal price paid by a firm for a given innovation
is independant of the quantity of the intermediate good corresponding to
this innovation. In this type of equilibrium, contrarily to that is generally
done in endogenous growth models, we distinguish innovations, which are
financed by Lindhal prices, and the intermediate goods in which they are
embodied, which are sold on competitive markets (and not by monopolists,
as in sub-section 3.2).
3.1.1 Agents behaviors
a) In the final sector, at each time t, the profit of each firm i is
piit = F
i(Lit, R
i
t,
∫ nt
0
f i(xit(j))dj)− wtLit − pRt Rit −
∫ nt
0
ptx
i
t(j)dj − ntvit
As we said above, the two last terms correspond to the payments for
intermediate goods and the payments (Lindahl prices) for innovations.
Observe that, in this particular problem, each innovation is an indivis-
ible public good : each firm i has to decide if it uses an intermediate
good j, or if it doesn’t. If it uses it, it pays vit to the inventor and
ptx
i
t(j) on the market. Differentiating with respect to the quantities of
inputs, Lit, R
i
t, x
i
t(j), and the number of innovations nt, and equating to
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zero, give the following first-order conditions :
F iL − wt = 0, (13)
F iR − pRt = 0, (14)
F ix(j) − pt = 0, j ∈ [0, nt], (15)
where F ix(j) = F
i
Xf
i′(xit(j)) is the marginal productivity of the interme-
diate good j,
F iXf
i(xit(nt))− ptxit(nt)− vit = 0. (16)
From (13) and (14), we see that the marginal productivities of labor
and resource are independant of i (as at optimum) : we can write
F iL = FL and F
i
R = FR, for all i, these productivities. From (15), we
have also F iXf
i′(xit(j)) = Fx, for all i and all j : all the intermediate
goods have the same productivity in all firms (see (8) for the same
propriety at optimum). Moreover, we have xit(j) = x
i
t (each firm i uses
the same quantity of intermediate goods), and thus xt(j) =
∑
i x
i
t(j) =∑
i x
i
t = xt, for all j : at equilibrium, intermediate goods are produced
in the same quantity. Finally, (16) gives the Lindahl price paid by each
firm i for a marginal increase in knowledge, that is to say for any new
innovation.
b) In the intermediate goods sector, the constant returns to scale technol-
ogy (see (5)) and the perfect competition assumption leads to
pt = rt. (17)
c) Now we consider the research sector. We define the value of an inno-
vation j at t as the sum of the present values of all the expected prices
paid for this innovation. This value is
Ht =
∫ ∞
t
vse
− ∫ st rududs, (18)
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where vs =
∑
i v
i
s +
∑
h v
h
s is the sum of the Lindhal prices paid at s by
all firms in the final sector and in the research sector. Differentiating
(18) with respect to t gives H˙t = −vt + rtHt, and thus
rt =
H˙t
Ht
+
vt
Ht
. (19)
The profit on one innovation by a firm h in the research sector is
piht = q
h(nt, `
h
t )Ht − wt`ht − ntvht
Maximizing piht with respect to `
h
t and nt gives the two following first
order conditions :
∂piht
∂`ht
= qh` Ht − wt = 0 (20)
∂piht
∂nt
= qhnHt − vht = 0 (21)
From (20), we see that qh` is independant of h : we write it q
h
` = q`.
Differentiating the equality Ht = wt/q` with respect to t gives
H˙t
Ht
=
w˙t
wt
− q˙`
q`
. (22)
d) Finally, the maximization of the intertemporal utility gives the stan-
dard condition :
ρ− u
′′(ct)c˙t
u′(ct)
= rt. (23)
Remark : this paragraph has been written assuming that firms of the
final sector and of the research sector directly pay the Lindhal prices. This
is possible only if their technologies exhibit constant or decreasing returns
to scale. If it is not the case, as for instance in standard endogenous growth
models where there are increasing returns to scale, it is necessary to make
other assumptions. The more simple is to assume that the Lindhal prices are
financed by public funds. An other possibility would be to assume that there
is imperfect competition in these sectors, but this assumption is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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3.1.2 Equilibrium and optimum
Our objective now is to show that the two characteristic efficiency conditions
obtained in section 2 are verified in this decentralized economy.
First it is easy to show that, as in the standard neoclassical model, the
Hotelling rule (8) is here also verified. From (15), Fx = pt, and (17), rt = pt,
we have Fx = rt. From (12), p˙
R
t /p
R
t = rt, and (14), FR = p
R
t , that gives
F˙R/FR = p˙
R
t /p
R
t , we have rt = F˙R/FR. Finally, we otbain Fx = F˙R/FR, that
is the Hotelling rule.
Second, we can also show that the new efficiency condition (9) is verified,
and we can compute the Lindhal prices paid by each agent.
Using (12), (14), (22), (13) (that gives F˙L/FL = w˙t/wt), and the condition
q`Ht = wt, (19) can be written
F˙R
FR
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙`
q`
+ vt
q`
FL
,
where vt =
m∑
i=1
vit +
M∑
h=1
vht .
From (16), (17) and (15), we have vit = F
i
Xf
i(xit(nt)) − Fxxit(nt), and
from (20) and (21) we have vht = q
h
nFL/q`. After substitution, the previous
condition becomes
F˙R
FR
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙`
q`
+
M∑
h=1
qhn +
q`
FL
(
m∑
i=1
F iXf
i(xi(n))− Fx
m∑
i=1
xi(n)
)
,
that is exactly the efficiency condition (9). These results confirm our claim
that the main difficulty to decentralize this economy comes from the fact
that knowledge is a public good.
Remark : if we assume that a representative household maximizes the
intertemporal utility
∫∞
0
u(ct)e
−ρtdt, it is easy to verify that the standard
Ramsey-Keynes condition is also verified, since from (23), (17) and (15), we
have ρ− u
′′c˙
u′
= Fx.
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Example 2 : Let us go back to the Aghion-Howitt, Schou and Scholz-
Ziemes model used in the example 1. From this example, we know that the
sum of the Lindhal prices paid by the final sector is
∑
i v
i =
∑
i F
i
Xf
i(xi(n))−
Fx
∑
i x
i(n) = L((1 − α)(R/L)ν(x/L)α. Similary, it is easy to obtain the
sum of the Lindhal prices paid by the research sector :
∑
h v
h = β(1 −
L)(R/L)ν(x/L)α. Finally, we have the Lindhal price received by each inno-
vator :
v =
∑
i
vi +
∑
h
vh = (R/L)ν(x/L)α(β + νL).
Let us note that all these Lindhal prices decrease at the same rate :
gv = νgR = ν
(−ρ
ε
+ δ
1− ε
ε
)
< 0 (see example 1).
3.2 Equilibrium with patents and optimal public poli-
cies
We assume now that the markets of the final good (Y ), labor (L) and the
natural resource (R) are competitive. Concerning the intermediate goods
sector we make the standard assumption that, once a new good is invented,
it is produced by a monopoly. In order to implement the optimal path
obtained in section 2, we use two tools : first, a subsidy (τ) for the demand
of each intermediate good ; secondly, a subsidy (σ) to the research.
3.2.1 Agents behaviors
a) In the final sector, the firm i profit is
piit = F
i(Lit, R
i
t
∫ nt
0
f i(xit(j))dj)− wtLit − pRt Rit −
∫ nt
0
pt(1− τ)xit(j)dj.
Differentiating piit with respect to L
i
t, R
i
t and x
i
t(j) gives the following
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first order conditions :
F iL − wt = 0, (24)
F iR − pRt = 0, (25)
F ix(j) − pt(1− τ) = 0, (26)
where we always have F ix(j) = F
i
Xf
i′(xit(j)).
These conditions are exactly the conditions (13)-(14)- (15) above, ex-
cept the term (1− τ) in (26). Thus, as in the first equilibrium, we have
F iL = FL, F
i
R = FR and F
i
x(j) = Fx, for all i and all j. Moreover, we
have as above xit(j) = x
i
t and xt(j) =
∑
i x
i
t(j) = xt, for all j.
Observe that (26) implicitely defines the demand of good j by firm i,
the slope of which is
∂xit(j)
∂pt
=
1− τ
F ixx
, for all j, (27)
where F ixx is the second derivative of F
i with respect to any interme-
diate good.
b) In the intermediate goods sector, the profit at each time t of the mo-
nopolist which produces any good j is
pimt = (pt − rt)xt =
(
Fx
1− τ − rt
)
xt, (28)
where xt =
∑
t x
i
t is the total quantity of good.
Using (27), the maximization of pimt leads to
xt +
(
Fx
1− τ − rt
) m∑
i=1
1− τ
F ixx
= 0, (29)
that gives the profit at its maximum level :
pimt =
−x2t∑
i ((1− τ)/F ixx)
(30)
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The value of a firm at t is Vt =
∫∞
t
pims e
− ∫ st rududs. Differentiating with
respect to t and rearranging gives
rt =
V˙t
Vt
+
pimt
Vt
(31)
c) In the research sector, the profit of a firm h is piht = q
h(nt, `
h
t )Vt−wt(1−
σ)`ht . The maximization of pi
h
t with respect to `
h
t gives q
h
` Vt−wt(1−σ) =
0. Thus, qh` is independant of h and we write it q`. The first-order
condition becomes
Vt =
(1− σ)wt
q`
(32)
d) Finally, the maximization of the intertemporal utility gives the condi-
tion (23) : ρ− u
′′
c˙t
u′
= rt.
3.2.2 Implementation of optimum
In section 2, we have characterized an efficient path by two conditions : the
Hotelling rule (8), and the “new” condition (9). It is possible to obtain two
similar conditions at equilibrium.
From (25) and (12), we have F˙R/FR = p˙
R
t /p
R
t = rt. Simultaneously, from
(29) we obtain
rt =
1
1− τ
(
Fx +
xt∑
i(1/F
i
xx)
)
.
Thus, we obtain a first condition similar to the Hotelling one :
F˙R
FR
=
1
1− τ
(
Fx +
xt∑
i(1/F
i
xx)
)
. (33)
Now we start from (31), rt = V˙t/Vt+pi
m
t /Vt (remember that rt = F˙R/FR).
From (32), Vt = (1−σ)wt/q`, we know that V˙t/Vt = w˙t/wt− q˙`/q` = F˙L/FL−
q˙`/q`. Finally, using (30) and (32) that give pi
m
t and Vt, we obtain a second
condition similar to the second efficiency condition :
F˙R
FR
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙`
q`
− x
2
t q`
(1− τ)(1− σ)FL
∑
i(1/F
i
xx)
. (34)
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It is now possible to write the system of two equations with which we can
compute the two optimal tools, τ and σ. For that, it is necessary that (8)
and (33) on one hand, and that (9) and (34) on the other hand, are identical.
We obtain
τ =
−xt
Fx
∑
i(1/F
i
xx)
(35)
and
M∑
h=1
qhn +
q`
FL
(
m∑
i=1
F iXf
i(xit)− xtFx
)
=
−xtq`
(1− τ)(1− σ)FL
∑
i(1/F
i
xx)
(36)
These two equations allow to compute the two optimal tools, σ and τ, as
it is shown in the following example.
Example 3 : we come back to the Aghion-Howitt, Schou and Scholz-
Ziemes model, and we study the equilibrium balanced growth paths.
First, as at optimum (Example 1), we verify that we obtain their results
in this particular case at equilibrium. At optimum, the Hotelling rule (8)
became (10) in the example, and the second efficiency condition (9) became
(11). Here, the two equilibrium conditions (33) and (34) become
gY − gR = 1
1− τ (α
2LβRνxα−1) (37)
and gR = gL + δ(1− L)− α(1− α)δL
(1− τ)(1− σ)β (38)
From the resource sector behavior, we know that F˙R/FR = gY − gR = r.
From the household behavior, we have also εgY + ρ = r. Thus, gR = gY (1−
ε)− ρ.
From the production function Y = Kαn1−αLβRν , we obtain gY = δ(1 −
L) + νgR/(1 − α) (remember that gL = 0 at steady state). Plugging these
results in (38), we have after some calculations
gY =
α(1− α)δ − αρν + (1− σ)(1− τ)βρ(1 + ν/(1− α))
α(β + νε) + (1− σ)(1− τ)β(1− ν(1− ε/ε(1− α))) (39)
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If σ = τ = 0 (no public intervention), we obtain the same formula than
Schou (formula (4.13)) and Scholz-Ziemes (formula 3.32). However, we can
go further because we can now compute the tools which allow to implement
the optimal path obtained in the Example 1.
Comparing (10) and (37), we immediately obtain the optimal rate of
subsidy to the demand of intermediate goods :
τ = 1− α (40)
that is a standard result in this type of model (see for instance Barro-Sala-
I-Martin (1995)). Now, since the optimal rate of growth is (δ − ρ)/ε (see
example 1), we obtain from (39) the optimal rate of subsidy to the research
σ =
εδν + β(δ − ρ)
εδ(1− α) + ν(εδ + ρ− δ) (41)
We can see that, under the condition 0 < δ − ρ < δε (see example 1),
we have 0 < σ < 1 (σ is a positive subsidy, and not a tax). In some sense,
this result confirms the result of Schou saying that “the market growth rate
is smaller than the optimal growth rate” (Appendix 6.3 of Schou’s paper).
4 Conclusion
The first objective of this paper was to characterize the efficient paths in
an economy including three stocks : a natural resource, physical capital
and knowledge. We obtained two condition. The first one is the standard
Hotelling rule ; it concerns the arbitrage between natural resource and phys-
ical capital. The second one, which concerns the arbitrage between natural
resource and knowledge, highlights some characteristics of knowledge. First,
knowledge is a public good. Second, it is generally assumed (for instance, in
endogenous growth models with innovations) that new knowledge is produced
by using several factors, among which labor and the existing stock of knowl-
edge, but not natural resources. Then the new efficiency condition has spe-
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cific features which bring it nearer the standard Lindhal-Bowen-Samuelson
condition, and which takes into account the auto-accumulation of knowledge.
The second objective was to construct equilibria in a decentralized econ-
omy. We studied two equilibria. In the first one, we assume that the new
knowledge, that is to say innovations, is financed by Lindhal prices. We show
that the two characteristics efficiency conditions are satisfied. In some sense,
this result confirms that the fundamental problem of decentralization in this
economy is the public good nature of knowledge. In the second one, which
corresponds to the standard theory, we assume that once a new good is in-
vented, it is produced by a monopoly. Then we show that it suffices to use
two tools, a subsidy to the demand of each intermediate good and a subsidy
to the research activity, to implement the efficient path.
Along the paper, all the results are obtained in a rather general model.
However, using the standard specifications of Schou (1996), Aghion-Howitt
(1998) and Scholz-Ziemes (1999), we show that their results are found again.
Moreover, we obtain some new results in their example : for instance, we
compute the Lindhal prices in the first type of equilibrium, and we give the
exact values of the two optimal subsidies in the second type.
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Appendices
Appendix A : Efficient paths
The Hamiltonian of the program (7) is
H =
m∑
i=1
Ri + λ
(∑
i
F i(Li, Ri,
∫ n
0
f i(xi(j))dj)− c
)
− µ
m∑
i=1
Ri + ν
M∑
h=1
qh(n, `h)
+θ
[∫ n
0
(
m∑
i=1
xi(j))dj −K
]
+ η
(
m∑
i=1
Li +
M∑
h=1
`h − 1
)
The first order conditions ∂H/∂Ri = 0, ∂H/∂xi(j) = 0, ∂H/∂Li = 0, and
∂µ/∂`h = 0 yield :
1 + λF iR − µ = 0 (A.1)
λF iXf
i′(xi(j)) + θ = 0 (A.2)
λF iL + η = 0 (A.3)
νqh` + η = 0 (A.4)
Moreover, ∂H/∂S = −µ˙, ∂H/∂K = −λ˙ and ∂H/∂n = ν˙ yield
−µ˙ = 0 (A.5)
−θ = −λ˙ (A.6)
λ
∑
i [F
i
Xf
i(xi(n))] + ν
∑
h q
h
n + θ
∑
i x
i(n) = −ν˙ (A.7)
A.1 and A.3 show that F iR and F
i
L are independant of i; thus we write
them FR and FL. Similary, A.2 shows that F
i
Xf
i′(xi(j)) is independant of
i and j; we write it Fx. Finally, A.4 shows that q
h
` is independant of h; we
write it q`.
Differentiating A.1 with respect to t, and using A.5, yield F˙R/FR = −λ˙/λ.
From A.2 and A.6, we have Fx = −λ˙/λ. Thus, we obtain a first condition,
that is the standard Hotelling rule :
F˙R
FR
= Fx (A.8)
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This condition concerns the arbitrage between natural resource and phys-
ical capital.
Dividing the two sides of A.7 by λ, we can replace ν/λ by FL/q` (from
A.3 and A.4), and θ
∑
xi(n)/λ by −Fx
∑
i x
i(n) (from A.2), that yields
∑
i
(
F iXf
i(xi(n))− Fxxi(n)
)
+
FL
q`
∑
h
qhn = −
ν˙
λ
From A.3 and A.4, we have λFL = νq`. Differentiating with respect to t
gives λF˙L + λF˙L = ν˙q` + νq˙`, and thus
− λ˙
λ
=
F˙L
FL
− ν˙q`
λFL
− νq˙L
λFL
Combining these two equations (remember that −λ˙/λ = F˙R/FR and
ν/λ = FL/q`) yield the second efficiency condition :
F˙R
FR
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙`
q`
+
M∑
h=1
qhn +
q`
FL
(
m∑
i=1
F iXf
i(xi(n))− Fx
m∑
i=1
xi(n)
)
(A.9)
This condition concerns the arbitrage between natural resource and knowl-
edge.
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Appendix B : Arbitrage between resource and
knowledge
The main objective of this appendix is to give a formal interpretation of the
efficiency condition (9) :
F˙R
FR
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙`
q`
+
M∑
h=1
qhn +
q`
FL
(
m∑
i=1
F iXf
i(xi(n))− Fx
m∑
i=1
xi(n)
)
We consider two dates, t and t + η, and two intervals of time, (t − dt, t)
and (t + η, t + η + dt), with dt ¿ η. The social planner faces initial profiles
of the different variables, denoted by {Yt}, {Kt}, {ct}, {Rt}, {Lt}, {`t}, {nt},
and, xt(j) for j ∈ [0, nt]. In order to characterize the efficient paths, he
modifies the initial profiles in the following manner (see Figure 1).
On (t − dt, t), he increases the labor used in research and he decreases
the labor used in the final sector. To maintain constant the level of output,
he has to extract more resource. However, the increase in labor devoted to
research allows to increase knowledge.
On (t, t + η), the first increase in knowledge leads to an acceleration of
the auto-accumulation of this good, because the flow of new knowledge at
each date depends on the existing stock (see equation (3)). Then, if the
profile of final output is always kept unchanged, the increase in knowledge
leads to a progressive release of labor that can be also used to accelerate the
accumulation of knowledge.
On (t + η, t + η + dt), the social planner brings back knowledge to its
original trajectory, by decreasing the labor used in this sector. Transfering
this labor to the final output sector, and keeping always constant this output,
he is now able to decrease the flow of extraction.
Finally, an efficient path of the economy is obtained if the initial increase
in the flow of extraction is equal to the final decrease in this flow.
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a) On (t−dt, t), the social planner increases the labor devoted to research
and he decreases the labor used in the final sector. Formally, we have
(∆Lt)dt = (−∆`t)dt < 0. This transfer has two consequences.
First, in order to maintain constant the level of output (Yt), it is nec-
essary to increase the flow of extraction. We obtain
(∆Rt)dt = (∆`t)dt
FL(t)
FR(t)
(B.1)
Second, the trajectory of knowledge is modified. Since n˙t =
∑
h q
h(nt, `
h
t ),
we obtain the new trajectory
n˜t = nt + q`(t)(∆`t)dt, (B.2)
where q` is the marginal productivity of labor in any firm of this sector.
b) On (t, t+ η), the social planner keeps unchanged all the initial profiles,
except {nt} and {`t}.
The problem is to calculate n˜t+η, that is to say the new level of knowl-
edge at the end of this sub-period.
From n˙t =
∑
h q
h(nt, `
h
t ), we have n˜t+η = n˜t +
∫ t+η
t
∑
h q
h(n˜τ , ˜`τ )dτ,
where ˜`τ is the new trajectory of `t. This equality can be written
n˜t+η = n˜t +
∑
h
∫ t+η
t
qh(nτ + n˜τ − nτ , `hτ + ˜`hτ − `hτ )dτ
Neglecting the second-order terms, we can approximate this expression
by
n˜t+η ' n˜t
+
∑
h
∫ t+η
t
qh(nτ , `
h
τ )dτ +
∑
h
∫ t+η
t
(n˜τ − nt)qhn(nτ , `τ )dτ
+
∑
h
∫ t+η
t
˜`h
τ − `hτ )qh` (nτ , `τ )dτ
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Since qh` = q` for all h, the last term can be written∫ t+η
t
q`(nτ , `τ )
∑
h
(˜`hτ − `hτ )dτ =
∫ t+η
t
(˜`τ − `τ )q`(nτ , `τ )dτ
From (B.2), n˜t = nt+q`(t)(∆`t)dt, and since nt = nt+η−
∑
h
∫ t+η
t
qh(nτ , `
h
t )dτ ,
we obtain finally
n˜t+η = nt+η + q`(t)(∆`t)dt +
∑
h
∫ t+η
t
(n˜τ − nτ )qhn(nτ , `τ )dτ
+
∫ t+η
t
(˜`τ − `τ )q`(nτ , `τ )dτ (B.3)
Our problem now is to calculate (˜`τ − `τ ). This can be done by differ-
entiating the production function Y iτ = F
i(Liτ , R
i
τ ,
∫ nτ
0
f i(xiτ (j)dj). We
obtain
dY iτ = F
i
LdL
i
τ + F
i
RdR
i
τ + F
i
Xf
i(xiτ (nτ))dnτ + F
i
X
∫ nτ
0
f i
′
(xiτ (j))dx
i
τ (j)dj
Since {Yt} and {Rt} are unchanged, we have dY iτ = 0 and dRiτ = 0.
Moreover, we use the fact that F iL does not depend on i, and we denote
it by FL. Then we obtain the new labor devoted to research, ˜`τ − `τ =∑
h(
˜`h
τ − `hτ ) = −
∑
i dL
i
τ , given by
˜`
τ − `τ =
∑
i F
i
Xf
i(xiτ (nτ )dnτ +
∑
i F
i
X
∫ nτ
0
f i
′
(xiτ (j))dx
i
τ (j)dj
FL
,
where we also have dnτ = n˜τ − nτ .
In order to calculate the second term in numerator, let us observe that,
since xiτ (j) = x
i
τ for all j, we have∑
i
F iX
∫ nτ
0
f i
′
(xiτ (j))dj =
∑
i
F iXf
i′(xiτ )
∫ nτ
0
dxiτ (j)dj = Fx
∑
i
∫ nτ
0
dxiτ (j)dj,
where F iXf
i′(xiτ ) = Fx, for all i, is the marginal productivity of any
intermediate good in the economy.
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Now we remember that each unit of intermediate good is produced with
one unit of capital (see (5) above), that gives Kτ =
∫ nτ
0
(
∑
i x
i
τ (j))dj.
Differentiating this equality with respect to nτ and x
i
τ (j), for all j ∈
[0, nτ ], and keeping Kτ constant, gives∑
i
xiτ (nτ )dnτ +
∫ nτ
0
∑
i
dxiτ (j)dj = 0.
Then, the second term in numerator above, Fx
∑
i
∫ nτ
0
dxiτ (j)dj, be-
comes −Fx
∑
i x
i
τ (nτ )dnτ , where dnτ = n˜τ−nτ . The new labor devoted
to research is now given by
˜`
τ − `τ = (n˜τ − nτ )(
∑
i F
i
Xf
i(xiτ (nτ ))− Fx
∑
i x
i
τ (nτ )
FL
Plugging this expression in (B.3), we obtain
n˜t+η = n˜t+η + q`(t)(∆`t)dt +
∑
h
∫ t+η
t
(n˜τ − nτ )qhn(nτ , `τ )dτ
+
∫ t+η
t
q`
FL
(n˜τ − nτ )(
∑
i
F iXf
i(xiτ (nτ ))− Fx
∑
xiτ (nτ ))dτ,
and thus
n˜τ+η = nτ+η + q`(t)∆`tdt
+
∫ t+η
t
(n˜τ − nτ )
[∑
h
qhn +
q`
FL
(
∑
i
F iXf
i(xiτ (nτ ))− Fx
∑
i
xiτ (nτ ))
]
dτ
(B.4)
c) On (t + η, t + η + dt), n comes back to its original trajectory, that is
to say from n˜t+η to nτ+η+dt. This decrease in n allows to release labor
from the research sector. The released labor is given by
∆(`t+η)dt =
nt+η+dt − n˜t+η
q`(t + η)
,
where nt+η+dt− n˜t+η is approximatively given by (B.4). This labor can
be devoted to the final sector. In other words, we have (∆Lt+ηdt =
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−(∆`t+η)dt, that gives a decrease in the flow of extraction given by
(∆Rt+η)dt = −(∆Lt+η)dtFL(t + η)
FR(t + η)
=
nt+η+dt − n˜t+η
q`(t + η)
FL(t + η)
FR(t + η)
(B.5)
Before comparing (B.1) and (B.5), we can give a simplified expression
of (B.4). When η is little, we can approximate n˜τ − nτ by q`(t)(∆`t)dt
(see (B.2)). Then from (B.4), we obtain
n˜τ+η − nτ+η '
q`(t)(∆`t)dt
[
1 +
(∑
h
qhn(t) +
q`(t)
FL(t)
)(∑
i
F iXf
i(xit(nt))− Fx
∑
i
xit(nt)
)
η
]
.
Plugging this expression in (B.5), we write the arbitrage equation that
has to be verified along any efficient path, and which says that the
initial increase (∆Rt)dt, given by (B.1), has to be equal to the final
decrease (∆Rt+η)dt, given by (B.4). We obtain
FL(t)
FR(t)
=
q`(t)
q`(t + η)
[
1 +
(∑
h
qhn(t) +
q`(t)
FL(t)
(
∑
i
F iXf
i(xit(nt))
−Fx
∑
i
xit(nt)
)
η
]
FL(t + η)
FR(t + η)
.
Since η is little, the term
(
FR(t + η)
FR(t)
q`(t + η)
q`(t)
)
/
FL(t + η)
FL(t)
can be ap-
proximated by 1 +
(
F˙R(t)
FR(t)
+
q˙`(t)
q`(t)
− F˙L(t)
FL(t)
)
η.
Finally, the arbitrage equation becomes
F˙R
FR
=
F˙L
FL
− q˙`
q`
+
∑
h
qhn +
q`
FL
(∑
i
F iXf
i(xi(n))− Fx
∑
i
xi(n)
)
,
that is exactly the efficiency condition (9) which concerns the arbitrage
between resource and knowledge.
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